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“phenomenological hermeneutics of sci-
ence” maintain the disciplinary gap between 
philosophy and the practice of science. They 
position the philosopher into the limited 
role of external commentator on the do-
ings of experiments and qualitative projects. 
Here, in turn, the physical scientists may 
not be sufficiently challenged to step out-
side of their metaphysical comfort zone of 
materialism. Merleau-Ponty would not have 
endorsed an academically departmentalized 
approach to the relation between philoso-
phy and the practice of science. Moreover, 
his style of phenomenology entreats re-
searchers to admit that we are all already in 
the position of the phenomenological phi-
losopher as much as we are doing science. 
As he writes with regard to the social sci-
ences: “Philosophy is not a particular body 
of knowledge; it is the vigilance which does 
not let us forget the source of all knowledge” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964: 110). The source of all 
knowledge, Merleau-Ponty refers to here is, 
of course, the immediacy of directly lived 
experience that is the ground of all fields of 
knowledge. Merleau-Ponty’s intra-ontology 
is asking for an interdisciplinarity relation-
ship between philosophy and the practice 
of science that is of a much more intimate 
order. Understanding this new ontology is 
hard enough, but how to exactly method-
ologically practice this new vision of science 
is the hard challenge ahead of us.
« 12 » In conclusion, a harder problem 
may, rather, be the pedagogical one. If phi-
losophy is implicit to all bodies of knowl-
edge and therefore not a self-contained dis-
cipline, then the approach Merleau-Ponty 
and Bitbol are taking is to further dissemble 
the disciplinary boundaries between the role 
of the philosopher and that of the actively 
engaged scientist. The concrete implication 
of this would be to offer a wider philosophi-
cal training to scientists and to, in turn, fur-
ther invite philosophers to widen the scope 
of their research to include, beyond textual 
exegesis, an applied practice based on a phe-
nomenologically renewed empiricism. So, 
how exactly should we envision the concrete 
pedagogical process for such future scien-
tist/philosophers – otherwise called neu-
rophenomenologists? What would be the 
appropriate curriculum and how could we 
institutionalize such training programs in 
the currently structured academic world? Q3
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> Abstract • A summary of the major 
metaphysical positions reveals them 
to be variable enough that they do not 
deny experience to the researcher. Fur-
ther, Merleau-Ponty’s intra-ontology and 
related terms are fleshed out.
Introduction
« 1 » As is usual in his work, Michel 
Bitbol has produced a concise essay with 
sharp insights that cut through layers of 
accumulated philosophic assumptions to 
take a fresh look at the sources of one of 
the major philosophical questions of the 
ages – the ontological source(s) of the mind-
body problem. Bitbol’s unique background 
in quantum theory, Buddhist meditational 
practice, and phenomenology provide him 
with a tripartite vision with which to inter-
rogate the traditional metaphysical posi-
tions employed in Western philosophy. Af-
ter a glance through these major paradigms 
and their dismissal, Bitbol proposes his own 
combination of Francisco Varela’s neurophe-
nomenology and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
intra-ontology that he indicates could lead 
to dynamic knowledge based in subjective 
transformation rather than more accumula-
tion of passive objective analysis.
« 2 » I feel his dismissals of the ma-
jor metaphysical viewpoints as themselves 
based in objective analysis while disregard-
ing experience is somewhat hasty. Further, 
I am unsatisfied with his necessarily brief 
discussion of intra-ontology, which touches 
so lightly on its subject that many readers 
will be confused. As I result, I did further 
research on the topic. With this in mind, I 
propose these questions for investigative 
guidelines:
Metaphysics
« 3 » Bitbol reviews the traditional 
metaphysical positions, seeing no help for 
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either idealism or materialism since each 
speaks for only half of the issue. Dualism 
only succeeds in keeping mind and matter 
separate.
« 4 » His further review is an effective 
rhetorical device, but perhaps a bit experi-
entially reductive. He next quickly touches 
on neutral monism but does not note that 
this position has been expounded in vari-
ous articulations from Baruch Spinoza to C. 
D. Broad, William James to Bertrand Rus-
sell, etc. He sees the position as fundamen-
tally objective (a “view from nowhere”) and 
physicalist, but the term “neutral” has also 
been used to mean unknown or unknow-
able. In this latter sense, experience has 
been indicated as the only way this neutral 
essence can be fully “known.” Alan Wallace 
(2006), for example, has attempted to equate 
the Buddhist void consciousness with the 
quantum void or vacuum, going beyond 
the mind-world schism. David Brubaker 
(2009) even attempts to link Merleau-Ponty 
with Buddhist scholarship in discussing the 
neutral nature of nothingness. However, as 
Bitbol notes, there is no indication of the dy-
namism of Max Velmans or the reversibility 
of Merleau-Ponty.
« 5 » Velmans’s (2008) postulate of re-
flexive monism is based in dynamism, as Bit-
bol notes, but sees as still carrying vestiges of 
dualism. It is an example of a “hybrid” in his 
Klein bottle thought experiment. Velmans 
would likely respond that his notion was 
more flexible than that, even to the point 
that it can function as neurophenomenol-
ogy.
« 6 » The double take of Bitbol’s on Va-
rela’s radical neurophenomenology (§47) 
can be applied equally well to Whitehead-
ian panexperientialism. Bitbol claims, how-
ever, that panexperientialism is “embed-
ded within the standard concept of nature 
and just make[s] room for experience as 
if it were some additional ingredient of 
it” (§27). This is certainly not the case for 
the panexperientialism of Whiteheadian 
metaphysics – the unfolding reality process 
advances as momentary occasions of ex-
perience, which then “perish” and become 
part of the objective world. Alfred North 
Whitehead (1978: 167) succinctly states 
that “apart from the experiences of subjects 
there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness.”
« 7 » These considerations take me to 
the following question: Are the metaphysi-
cal positions of neutral monism, reflexive 
monism, or panexperientialism more derived 
from objective analysis (i.e., materialism) 
than experiential exploration (i.e., phenom-
enology)? Q1
Intra-ontology
« 8 » I first understood Bitbol’s use of 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intra-ontology 
to be just another way to express the idea of 
insight learning, that is, inner transforma-
tive experiential understanding over mere 
impartial, objective measurement or data 
analysis, but the implication of the research-
er in the research goes much deeper than 
that. Bitbol indicates this, but it took this 
reader further investigation to understand. 
What is intra-ontology?
« 9 » The short and somewhat messy 
answer is that intra-ontology follows from 
what is commonly known as the “observer 
effect” in quantum physics – i.e., that the act 
of observation changes the phenomenon 
observed, such that it is impossible to speak 
of a phenomenon without simultaneously 
referring back to an observer. The prefix “in-
tra-” denotes that we are embedded in and 
enveloped by the world we are studying in 
such a way that our knowledge is finite in 
comparison to the world’s infinitude. The 
longer answer is below in two parts.
« 10 » To understand the basic idea of 
intra-ontology, it helps to understand some 
related ideas, namely: radical reflection, flesh, 
and chiasm. These ideas will be contrasted 
with the notions of “high-flying thought” 
and belief in an objective world.
« 11 » Merleau-Ponty first proposes the 
method of intra-ontology in his unfinished 
work The Visible and the Invisible (1968). 
However, a similar nascent concept already 
appears in his earlier work Phenomenology 
of Perception (1962). In that work, Merleau-
Ponty proposes the method of “radical re-
flection” as an alternative to the “high-flying 
thought” (la pensée de survol), which Mer-
leau-Ponty claims has been practiced by the 
majority of philosophers before him. The es-
sential feature of high-flying thought is the 
belief in an objective world that exists inde-
pendently from its relation to an observer 
and whose characteristics remain the same 
independently of that relationship.
« 12 » In contrast to the high-flying 
thought of objectivism, “radical reflection is 
conscious of its own dependence on an un-
reflected life that is its initial, constant, and 
final situation” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xxiii). 
By doing a “phenomenology of phenom-
enology,” radical reflection concludes that 
previous philosophical attempts to “brack-
et” or suspend belief in the existence of the 
world are always incomplete because they 
are premised on a fundamental affirmation 
that there is something to doubt – namely, 
the phenomenal world as it appears to me 
throughout everyday existence. The world 
marks the “horizon of horizons” within 
which our existence resides. From this, two 
consequences follow: first, we are always 
in some relation to the world, such that it 
cannot be doubted; second, the world’s ex-
istence exceeds and envelops our own exis-
tence, such that no phenomenon is ever fully 
present to us all at once. For Merleau-Ponty, 
this perspectival withdrawal of phenomena 
is yet indicative of their presence. Existing 
within the world and worldly things being 
never present to us all at once entails that 
we are never fully present to ourselves all at 
once. There are parts of us that exceed their 
appearance to our conscious awareness – 
this is the mark of our belonging to a real-
ity beyond visible phenomena, as Merleau-
Ponty described it.
« 13 » Radical reflection begins from 
the admission that the classical attempt of 
thought to grasp its own roots and close it-
self inside of a hermetically sealed sphere of 
immanence in which only apodictic truths 
can present themselves necessarily fails. We 
can neither stand outside of the world to 
make it an object of our perception, nor can 
we stand outside of ourselves.
« 14 » With Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
reversibility of the flesh, we have to won-
der about our assumptions to do with the 
body’s separation from the world. We will 
need to relate it to the concept of chiasm. 
Now, chiasm is a rhetorical structure in 
which two elements (say, A and B) are 
repeated in such a way that, in the repeti-
tion, the first element is swapped with the 
second element: AB becomes BA. A chi-
asm establishes something like an inverted 
mirror relationship between two figures. 
Merleau-Ponty deploys the notion of chi-
asm to denote this reversible relationship 
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between “inner” and “outer” experience, 
between “perceiver” and “perceived,” be-
tween “body” and “world.”
« 15 » A working note reads: “[…] in-
side and outside turning about one another” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968: 264). The dialectical 
and chiasmic interplay between perceiver 
and perceived leads Merleau-Ponty to write 
that “We might say that we perceive the 
things themselves, that we are the world that 
thinks itself – or that the world is at the heart 
of our flesh” (ibid: 179). The world appears 
as a mirror of our own existence, and like-
wise, we mirror the world. We are two mir-
rors facing each other.
« 16 » Since Merleau-Ponty’s radical 
phenomenology is as much creative discov-
ery as logical investigation, I wonder: What 
is the purpose of Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
express the anti-metaphysics that he names 
an intra-ontology? Q2
Conclusion
« 17 » The body and the world share the 
same flesh. They each reflect and encroach 
upon the other in a chiasmic relationship. 
The boundaries between “inside” and “out-
side” are blurred – instead, perception gives 
us an “inside of the outside and an outside 
of the inside” “turning about one another.”
« 18 » We cannot adopt a high-flying 
thought that dissociates perceiver and per-
ceived from each other to consider each in-
dependently. The act of perception produces 
effects in both the perceived thing and the 
perceiver. We cannot imagine a “subjec-
tive” world that exists discretely from an 
“objective” world; the flesh of the world is 
simultaneously subjective and objective. 
Here it may be helpful to recall the notion 
of double sensation – every moment of my 
vision is doubled by a vision of myself; ev-
erything that I touched is doubled by my 
being touched. These two aspects of percep-
tion never coincide in an absolute identity, 
but they can never be dissociated from each 
other, either – they constitute a two-sided 
being, like the verso and recto of a page, a 
“unity-in-difference.”
« 19 » Intra-ontology begins from those 
premises. I said earlier that the “observer 
effect” provides a short and messy illustra-
tion, and now I hope that it is obvious why 
I called it messy. The idea that the world is 
“changed” by observation implies that we 
can speak of a world that exists before its 
appearance to a perceiver, which Merleau-
Ponty explicitly rejects. Perception reveals 
to us that the world certainly pre-existed its 
appearance to us, but the anteriority of the 
world is revealed only through its presence 
to us. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasmic 
flesh adds to the observer effect a mirror re-
lation of perceiver and perceived that cannot 
be dissociated from each other, because each 
forms half of a whole.
« 20 » Now that I have finished this 
brief exegesis, I can understand why Bitbol 
turned to the four-dimensional image of the 
Klein bottle. The one image is the same idea 
that I have attempted to elucidate but much 
more succinct.
« 21 » Indeed, Bitbol’s essay is complete 
in itself. It makes the strong point that our 
traditional metaphysical positions are too 
much embedded in the viewpoint and phil-
osophical method that brought them forth, 
to wit, objective analysis. Epistemologically 
speaking, the only knowledge such “high-
flying” metaphysical positions can produce 
is objective, discarnate, and impersonal. 
Though I suggested that some of these posi-
tions may leave openings for transformative 
experience, Bitbol is quite correct in noting 
that in philosophy, broadly speaking, this 
has rarely happened. Merleau-Ponty’s radi-
cal intra-ontology may be one way to indi-
cate understanding to transform the person 
understanding.
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